演講者簡介 : Professor Ilwoo (Iru) Hwang received his PhD in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania in 2014. He is currently an Associate Professor at Seoul National University. His research interests are Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics, Bargaining, Industrial Organization, Organizational Economics, and Political Economy.
演講摘要 : This paper analyzes the "integrative" aspect of bargaining, in which the bargaining parties attempt to reconcile their interests. The model consists of two phases. In the integrative phase, the bargainers receive information about the bargaining surplus. If any of the bargainers stop learning, then the distributive phase occurs in which the bargainers divide the surplus via standard random-proposer bargaining. We show that even with an arbitrarily small cost of learning, the integrative phase disappears if bargainers' outside options are sufficiently asymmetric. We also investigate the optimal choice of information structure in the integrative phase. Contrary to public belief, the information structure focusing on the downside loss is only sometimes optimal.
