演講者簡介 : Prof. Daniel Krähmer received his Ph.D. in Economics from Freie Universität Berlin in 2003. He is currently a Professor at the Universität Bonn. His current research interests is the relation between dynamic and static models of monopolistic screening.
演講摘要 : We consider a dynamic screening model where the agent may go bankrupt due to, for example, cash constraints. We model bankruptcy as a verifiable event that occurs whenever the agent makes a per period loss. This gives rise to less stringent truth-telling constraints than merely requiring that the agent has to obtain a non-negative per period utility. This is so because misreports become verifiable if they force the agent into bankruptcy. Moreover, we develop a novel method for deriving the optimal contract in a setting with cash constraints by ranking contracts in terms of the spread of the distribution of the induced continuation values for the agent. In a setting with continuous types, we derive a regularity condition that ensures that the optimal contract is deterministic.
