演講者簡介 : Professor Uday Rajan received his Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University in 1995. He is currently a David B. Hermelin Professor of Business Administration at University of Michigan. His research focuses on informational frictions such as adverse selection and moral hazard and their effect on market transactions, with recent work on the role of credit ratings in the financial markets and on FinTech competition in banking.
演講摘要 : Should payment services and lending be bundled together in a bank or provided as standalone functions? We consider a model in which payment data are informative about credit quality, and there is a deterioration in the payment signal if it has to be transferred to the standalone lender. Any lender may invest in advanced data analytics that generate an enhanced signal about borrower quality. In most settings, bundling payment services and lending together into a bank is socially optimal. A standalone lender may be socially optimal in an intermediate range of parameters for which the bank is deterred from investing in the enhanced signal. We discuss the implications for narrow banking and the future FinTech landscape.
