演講者簡介 : Prof. Duarte Gonçalves received his Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia University in 2021. He is currently an Assistant Professor at University College London. His research interests are Microeconomic Theory, Behavioral and Experimental Economics, and Information Economics.
演講摘要 : This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents’ behavior and acquire information to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a disciplined model featuring an endogenous distribution of choices, beliefs, and decision times, that not only rationalizes well-known deviations from Nash equilibrium, but also makes novel predictions supported by existing data. It grounds a relationship between empirical learning and strategic sophistication, and generates stochastic choice through randomness inherent to sampling, without relying on indifference or choice mistakes. Further, it provides a rationale for Nash equilibrium when information costs vanish.
