演講者簡介 : Professor Jehiel received his Ph.D. in Economics from E.H.E.S.S. (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales) in 1992. He is currently a Research fellow at Paris School of Economics and Professor of Economics at University College London (half time). His research fields are Game theory, Mechanism design, and Bounded rationality.
演講摘要 : We study the existence of efficient auctions in private value settings in which some bidders choose their bids based on the accessible data from past similar auctions consisting of bids and ex post values. We consider steady-states in such environments with a mix of rational and data-driven bidders, and we allow for correlation across bidders in the signal distributions about the ex post values. After reviewing the working of the approach in second-price and first-price auctions, we show our main result that there is no efficient auction in such environments.
