演講者簡介 : Professor Chu received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Michigan in 1985. He is currently a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica. His research fields are Population Economics, Law and Economics, Public Economics, Regional Economics, and Family Economics.
演講摘要 : Suppose people in a capitalist society order policies mainly by comparing their wealth changes induced by various policies. We show that the property prices play the role of aligning individual preferences, which naturally modifies the axiom of universal domain of social decision function. Under reasonable and testable assumptions, we prove that this alignment effect eliminates the possibility of Condorcet Cycles (Condorcet 1785) and warrant the transitivity of the majority voting mechanism. Taking away private properties will reinstitute Condorcet Cycles, returning the inescapable conclusion of a dictatorial social decision rule, as claimed by Arrow (1951). Our result provides partial support to the practices of voting eligibility tests implemented in many democratic countries.
