【Theory webinar】Screening Adaptive Cartels

  • 研討會日期 : 2022-05-24
  • 時間 : 09:00
  • 主講人 : Professor Juan Ortner
  • 地點 : online
  • 演講者簡介 : Professor Ortner received his Ph.D. in Economics from Princeton University in 2012. He is currently an Associate Professor at Boston University. His research interests are Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Political Economy.
  • 演講摘要 : We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. We emphasize the use of asymptotically safe tests, i.e. tests that are passed with probability approaching one by competitive firms, regardless of the underlying economic environment. Our main result establishes that screening for collusion with safe tests is a robust improvement over laissez-faire. Safe tests do not create new collusive equilibria, and do not hurt competitive industries. In addition, safe tests can have strict bite, including unraveling all collusive equilibria in some settings. We provide evidence that cartel adaptation to regulatory oversight is a real concern.