演講者簡介 : Professor Konrad received his Ph.D. in Economics from Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (in Munich of Germany) in 1990. Since January 2011, He is the Director at the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance and since 2009 Scientific Member of the Max Planck Society. His research interests are Political Economy, Public Finance, and Economic Policy.
演講摘要 : The level of technology investment is one of the central dimensions of competition between states for dominance and hegemonic influence. Motivated by the technology leadership competition between the U.S. and China, the theoretical analysis in this paper studies technology races first in a unipolar world, identifies what incentives there are on the part of smaller countries to balance, and how returns from technology are distributed in equilibrium. The key analysis is on a comparison with a bipolar world order. The comparison shows that smaller nations’ incentives to balance diminish. Much of the potential technology benefits of dominant countries are dissipated in competition for technology leadership. And despite greater competition, in the equilibrium the globally available level of technology may be lower in a bipolar world.
