演講者簡介 : Professor Gersbach received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Basel in 1986. He is currently a Professor at ETH Zurich. His research interests are Macroeconomic Thinking and Economic Policy.
演講摘要 : We examine how the introduction of an interest-bearing central bank digital currency (CBDC) impacts bank activities and monetary policy. At any time, households can switch from bank deposits to CBDC which is a safe medium of exchange. As banks might face digital runs, either because depositors have a preference for CBDC or fear bank insolvency, monetary policy can use collateral requirements and penalties for illiquidity to initially increase bankers’ monitoring incentives in the presence of CBDCs. This leads to higher aggregate productivity. However, the mass of households holding CBDC will increase over time, causing additional liquidity risk for banks. At some tipping point, monetary policy with tight collateral requirements, thereby generating liquidity risk and exposing bankers to illiquidity penalties, would render banking non-viable and prompt the central bank to abandon such policies. Then, the bankers’ monitoring incentives would revert to low levels. Accordingly, a CBDC can yield short-term welfare gains at best.
