演講者簡介 : Professor Nöldeke received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Bonn and the London School of Economics in 1992. He is currently a professor of economics at the University of Basel. His research focuses on microeconomic theory, game theory, and social evolution.
演講摘要 : In dynamic matching markets where individuals arrive over time there is a tradeoff between matching as many agents as possible and the average quality of matches. We investigate this tradeoff in a search-and-matching market with random meetings between agents. In our model, optimally requires to match as many agents as possible when frictions are high and to only realize high quality matches when frictions are low. Equilibria are either optimal or deviate from optimality by inducing too many matches. We characterize the circumstances in which equilibria are inefficient. In particular, when good matching opportunities are scarce, inefficient equilibria exist no matter how low the search frictions are.
