演講者簡介 : Professor Hu received his Ph.D. in Economics from Penn State University in 2009. He is currently a Professor of Economics at University of Bristol. His research interests are Monetary economics, Banking theory, Game theory, Complexity, Network.
演講摘要 : A large number of firms with risky projects requires external funding from lenders. The realized return of the firms is private information. We adopt the costly-state-verification model by Townsend (1979) to elaborate the delegated monitoring model (Diamond, 1984) of financial intermediation, but with three novelties. First, agents cannot commit to their verification strategy. Second, lenders may be risk averse. Third, we allow aggregate uncertainty and introduce a charter system. Static bank contracts are socially beneficial without aggregate uncertainty, but they may not be so if there is significant aggregate uncertainty. The beneficial role is retained with the charter system and dynamic bank contracts, even with aggregate uncertainty. They also provide more financial stability than static ones. Two banking regulations are shown to be optimal. Regulation Q can be optimal if the regulator wants to minimize dead weight loss from verification when a monopoly bank competes with potential direct contracts. Deposit insurance can be welfare-improving if the dynamic bank contract is not financially stable.
