演講者簡介 : Professor Takeoka received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Rochester in 2006. He is currently a Professor at Hitotsubashi University. His research fields are Microeconomics, Decision Theory, Game Theory, and General Equilibrium.
演講摘要 : As in the growing literature of rational inattention, decision making about information acquisition has been recognized increasingly in economics. If the agent may not be able to form a probabilistic belief over states because of the scarcity of relevant information for decision making, a decision about information acquisition seems even more significant. By adopting the choice theoretic model of information acquisition, provided in de Oliveira, Denti, Mihm, and Ozbek (2017), we argue that one of their axioms, which takes a form of quasi-convexity of preference, excludes ambiguity aversion toward three types of ambiguity sources: ambiguity about priors, ambiguity about posteriors, and ambiguity about feasibility of information structures. By relaxing their quasi-convexity axiom, we axiomatically characterize a model of information acquisition, which allows for the first and the third types of ambiguity aversion.
