演講者簡介 : Professor Sun received his Ph.D. in Economics from the Ohio State University in 2008. He is currently an Associate Professor at Deakin University. His research interests are Game Theory, Industrial Organization, and Contract Theory.
演講摘要 : A given set of lands need to be acquired to implement a project and the buyer can resort to the exercise of eminent domain. Can efficient and fair outcomes be achieved when parties bargain in the shadow of eminent domain? We develop a dynamic multilateral bargaining model to investigate how the ambiguities in eminent domain laws affect the efficiency of outcomes, extent of holdouts, the division of surplus between the buyer (executive arm of government or an authorized private entity acting on behalf of the government) and sellers (property owners whose properties are acquired), and the resulting welfare levels. We characterize the set of Markov perfect equilibria of the game and provide conditions under which the equilibrium is efficient and/or fair. We show when the power of eminent domain is moderate, the equilibrium is fair and efficient, i.e., in equilibrium sellers are compensated at least their subjective values for their properties (fairness), and agreement occurs immediately so there is no holdout (efficiency).
