演講者簡介 : Professor Skreta received her Ph.D. in Economic from University of Pittsburgh in 2001. She is currently a Professor at University of Texas at Austin and University College London. Her research field are Microeconomic theory, game theory, mechanism design theory, finance theory.
演講摘要 : A designer is privately informed about the state and chooses an information disclosure mechanism to influence the decisions of multiple agents playing a game. We define an intuitive class of incentive compatible information disclosure mechanisms which we coin interim optimal mechanisms. We prove that an interim optimal mechanism exists, and that it is an equilibrium outcome of the interim information design game. An ex-ante optimal mechanism may not be interim optimal, but it is whenever it is ex-post optimal. In addition, in leading settings in which action sets are binary, every ex-ante optimal mechanism is interim optimal. We relate interim optimal mechanisms to other solutions of informed principal problems.
