【Theory webinar】Collective Information Acquisition
2021/06/22
研討會日期 : 2021-06-22
時間 : 15:00
主講人 : Professor Ran Eilat
地點 : online
演講者簡介 : Professor Eilat received his Ph.D. in Economic from Tel-Aviv University in 2016. He is currently an Assistant Professor at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Israel). His research interests include micro-economic theory, game-theory, information economics and mechanism design.
演講摘要 : We consider the problem faced by a group of players who bargain over what public signal to acquire before deciding on a collective action. The players differ in their privately known state-dependent payoffs from taking the action, and therefore differ also in their willingness to pay for the public signal. We take a mechanism design approach to characterize the frontier of outcomes achievable via bargaining over information. We identify novel distortions in the optimal information structure that arise from the information asymmetry and because, after the signal is realized, the outcome is determined in equilibrium of a subsequent voting game.
