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【Macro/Finance webinar】Corporate Governance in the Presence of Active and Passive Delegated Investment


  • 研討會日期 : 2021-08-06
  • 時間 : 09:00
  • 主講人 : Professor Nadya Malenko
  • 地點 : online
  • 演講者簡介 : Professor Malenko received her Ph.D. in Finance from Stanford University in 2011. She is currently an Associate Professor at the University of Michigan. Her research interests are Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance, Organizational Economics, and Private Equity.
  • 演講摘要 : We examine the governance role of delegated portfolio managers. In our model, investors decide how to allocate their wealth between passive funds, active funds, and private savings, and fund fees are endogenously determined. Funds’ ownership stakes and fees determine their incentives to engage in governance. Whether passive fund growth improves governance depends on whether it crowds out private savings or active funds. In the former case, it improves governance even though it is accompanied by lower fund fees, whereas in the latter case it can be detrimental to governance. Overall, passive fund growth improves governance only if it does not increase fund investors’ returns too much. Regulations that decrease funds’ costs of engagement can be opposed by both fund investors and fund managers even though they are value-increasing.