【Macro/Finance webinar】Monetary Policy with Reserves and CBDC: Optimality, Equivalence, and Politics

  • 研討會日期 : 2021-04-15
  • 時間 : 15:00
  • 主講人 : Professor Dirk Niepelt
  • 地點 : online
  • 演講者簡介 : Professor Niepelt received his Ph.D. in Economics from Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2000. He is currently a Professor at the University of Bern. His research fields are Macroeconomics, International Finance, and Public Finance.
  • 演講摘要 : We analyze policy in a two-tiered monetary system. Noncompetitive banks issue deposits while the central bank issues reserves and a retail CBDC. Monies differ with respect to operating costs and liquidity. We map the framework into a baseline business cycle model with "pseudo wedges" and derive optimal policy rules: Spreads satisfy modified Friedman rules and deposits must be taxed or subsidized. We generalize the Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019) result on the macro irrelevance of CBDC but show that a deposit based payment system requires higher taxes. The model implies annual implicit subsidies to U.S. banks of up to 0.8 percent of GDP during the period 1999-2017.