【Macro/Finance webinar】Disclosing to Informed Traders

  • 研討會日期 : 2021-03-19
  • 時間 : 09:00
  • 主講人 : Professor Snehal Banerjee
  • 地點 : online
  • 演講者簡介 : Professor Banerjee received his Ph.D. in Finance from Stanford Graduate School of Business in 2007. He is currently an Associate Professor of Finance at the University of California, San Diego. His research interests include information, learning and disagreement in financial markets, liquidity, behavioral finance and asset pricing.
  • 演講摘要 : We develop a model of costly voluntary disclosure in the presence of diversely-informed investors. The manager’s disclosure strategy influences trading by investors, which in turn affects the manager’s incentives to disclose. When the manager is known to be informed, there exists a unique threshold equilibrium in which only sufficiently good news is disclosed. This equilibrium exhibits two novel features. First, more public information can increase the likelihood of voluntary disclosure. Second, the firm is either over- or under-valued relative to fundamentals, depending on how investors use the information in prices. When investors are uncertain about whether the manager is informed and investors’ information is sufficiently precise, this threshold equilibrium may break down.