Optimal Disclosure of Private Information to Competitors

  • 研討會日期 : 2021-01-21
  • 時間 : 10:30
  • 主講人 : Ms. Rosina Rodríguez Olivera
  • 主持人 : Professor Chih-Chun Yang
  • 地點 : Conference Room B110
  • 演講者簡介 : Ms. Olivera will receive her Ph.D. in Economics from University of Michigan in 2021. Her research field is Microeconomic Theory. She is applying for a position of the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica now.
  • 演講摘要 : I consider a duopoly model with differentiated substitutes, price competition, and uncertain demand, in which one firm has an information advantage over a competitor. I study the incentives of the informed firm to share its private information with its competitor and the incentives of a regulator to constrain or enforce disclosure in order to benefit consumers. I show that full disclosure of information is optimal for the informed firm, because it increases price correlation and surplus extraction from consumers. I also show that the regulator can increase expected consumer surplus and welfare by restricting disclosure, but that, surprisingly, consumers can benefit from the regulator privately disclosing some information to the competitor. Disclosure increases the ability of firms to extract surplus from consumers, but private disclosure allows consumers to arbitrage prices by creating a coordination failure in firm pricing. I show that private partial disclosure is optimal for consumers when firms offer sufficiently close substitutes. My findings highlight the effect of an uneven distribution of consumer data between firms on welfare allocation. They also inform an ongoing policy debate about how regulatory entities can control the dissemination of information between firms to protect consumers.