Weight-Ranked Divide-and-Conquer Contracts

  • 研討會日期 : 2021-01-19
  • 時間 : 10:30
  • 主講人 : Mr. Lester T. Chan
  • 主持人 : Professor Chih-Chun Yang
  • 地點 : online
  • 演講者簡介 : Mr. Chan will receive his Ph.D. in Economics from Boston University in 2021. His research field are Microeconomic Theory, and Industrial Organization. He is applying for a position of the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica now.
  • 演講摘要 : This paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and multiple agents. Multiple equilibria arise due to agents’ strategic interactions. In general, the principal’s optimal contracting scheme varies with the choice of equilibrium selection criterion or implementation requirement. Nevertheless, for a large class of models where agents’ payoffs constitute a weighted potential game, I show that one contracting scheme is optimal for a large class of equilibrium selection criteria and implementation requirements. This scheme ranks agents in ascending order of their weights in the weighted potential game and induces them to accept their offers in a dominance-solvable way, starting from the first agent. With the general results, I derive robust predictions and policy guidance for a wide variety of applications, including networks and pure/impure public goods/bads.