Robust Inference in First-Price Auctions: Experimental Findings as Identifying Restrictions
2020/02/20
研討會日期 : 2020-02-20
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Serafin Grundl
主持人 : Professor Chu-An Liu
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Grundl received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Wisconsin in 2014. He is currently a Senior Economist at Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. His research fields are Industrial Organization, Microeconomics, and Econometrics and Statistics.
演講摘要 : This paper shows how experimental findings can be used for structural estimation. In laboratory experiments bidding in first-price auctions is more aggressive than predicted by the risk-neutral Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (RNBNE) - a finding known as the overbidding puzzle. Instead of estimating a particular model of overbidding, we use the overbidding restriction itself for identification, which allows us to bound the valuation distribution and the seller's payoff function. These bounds are consistent with RNBNE and all models of overbidding and remain valid if there is unobserved heterogeneity in the bidding strategies. We evaluate the validity of the bounds numerically and in experimental data.
