演講者簡介 : Professor Chakraborty received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of British Columbia in 2017. He is currently an Assistant Professor at University of California, Davis. His research fields are Economic Theory, Behavioral Economics, and Experimental Economics.
演講摘要 : This paper introduces and studies the Network Dilemma game, which embeds a social dilemma within a network formation game. The game models the voluntary provision of a costly public good that is locally non-excludable in an endogenous network structure. In order to garner the benefits of a volunteer's public good provision, an agent must be connected to her. In this environment, all equilibrium networks are star networks that exhibit ex-post payoff inequality between the central public good provider and peripheral players. We observe high levels of equilibrium behavior, despite the coordination problem faced by the ex-ante homogeneous subjects. In our treatments with a moderate level of ex-post payoff inequality, coordination on a star network appears to be facilitated by subjects who signal a willingness to volunteer as the center persistently. In our sequential treatment the modal outcome is a non-subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, where the first player responds to behavioral uncertainty by volunteering immediately. In a followup treatment, where we manipulate and reduce the degree of behavioral uncertainty, the modal outcome changes to the subgame perfect star network where early moving players connect to the last player to move, who is then forced to provide the public good.
