Optimal Monopoly Mechanisms with Demand Uncertainty
2019/10/01
研討會日期 : 2019-10-01
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Jeevant Rampal
主持人 : Professor Ritesh Jain
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Rampal received his Ph.D. in Economics from Ohio State University in 2017. He is currently an Assistant Professor in Economics at Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad. His main research fields are Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Mechanism Design, and Agricultural Economics.
演講摘要 : This paper analyzes a monopoly firm's profit maximizing mechanism in the following context. There is a continuum of consumers with a unit demand for a good. The distribution of the consumers' valuations is given by one of two possible demand distributions/states: high demand or low demand. The consumers are uncertain about the demand state, and they update their beliefs after observing their own valuation for the good. The firm is uncertain about the demand state, but infers the demand state when the consumers report their valuations. The firm's problem is to maximize profits by choosing an optimal mechanism among the class of anonymous, deterministic, direct revelation mechanisms that satisfy interim incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality. We show that, under certain sufficient conditions, the firm's optimal mechanism is to set the monopoly price in each demand state. Under these conditions, Segal's (2003) optimal ex post mechanism is robust to relaxing ex post incentive compatibility to interim incentive compatibility.
