演講者簡介 : Professor Chen received his Ph.D. in Economics from Northwestern University in 2009. He is currently an Associate Professor at National University of Singapore. His research fields are Microeconomics Theory, Game Theory, Mathematical Economics and Information Economics.
演講摘要 : We examine the information design problem in a single-object allocation setting with multiple buyers who receive independent private signals for their binary private value. We characterize the buyer-optimal information structure which maximizes the buyers’ surplus and the seller-worst information structure which minimizes the seller’s revenue, both assuming that the seller adopts Myerson’s (1981) optimal auction in response to the information structure. In contrast to the situation with a single buyer where the two optimal information structures coincide and the object is always sold, we show that (i) the two optimal information structures differ with two or more buyers, although both converge to no disclosure when the number of buyers goes to infinity; (ii) the object remains always sold under the seller-worst information structure but not under the buyer-optimal information structure.
