Efficiency of Stable Matching with Two-sided Incomplete Information
2019/06/21
研討會日期 : 2019-06-21
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Yi-Chun Chen (陳逸羣)
主持人 : Professor Chih-Chun Yang
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Chen received his Ph.D. in Economics from Northwestern University in 2009. He is currently an Associate Professor at National University of Singapore. His research fields are Microeconomics Theory, Game Theory, Mathematical Economics and Information Economics.
演講摘要 : We study two-sided job-market matching with incomplete information on both sides and transferable utility. We prove that all stable matchings are efficient, provided that either (1) it is common knowledge that the wage scheme is strictly increasing in the agents' types; or (2) the realized type distribution is common knowledge and all types are distinct.
