演講者簡介 : Professor Kunimoto received his Ph.D. in Economics from Brown University. He is currently an Associate Professor at Singapore Management University. His research interests are Bargaining, Contract Theory, Game Theory, Mechanism Design, and Microeconomic Theory.
演講摘要 : The robust mechanism design literature investigates the global robustness of optimal mechanisms to large changes in the environment. Acknowledging the global robustness as an overly demanding requirement, we propose continuous
implementation as a local robustness of optimal mechanisms to small changes in the environment. We say that a social choice function is continuously implementable ``with small transfers'' if there are a mechanism augmented by arbitrarily small transfers and an equilibrium of that augmented mechanism which yields the outcome close to the desired one for all types close to the designer's initial model. We show that when a generic correlation condition is imposed on the class of interdependent values environments, any incentive compatible social choice function is continuously implementable with small transfers. This exhibits a stark contrast with Bergemann and Morris (2005) who show that their global robustness amounts to ex post incentive compatibility as well as Oury and Tercieux (2012) who show that continuous implementation generates a substantial restriction, tightly connected to full implementation in rationalizable strategies.
