Voluntary Private Contributions to Public Goods and the Optimal Non-linear Income Tax
2019/04/09
研討會日期 : 2019-04-09
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Yi Zhang (張藝)
主持人 : Professor Cheng-Chen Yang
地點 : Conference Room C103
演講者簡介 : Professor Zhang received her Ph.D. in Economics from York University in 2018. She is currently an Assistant Professor at Shandong University. Her research interests are Tax Policy, Public Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Microeconomic Theory.
演講摘要 : Subsidizing voluntary contributions to public good could possibly achieve the same social goals as the direct public provision. In this analysis, I develop a unifying model encompassing both the government-funded public good and private contributions in the optimal income tax problem. One purpose of this paper is to find out the Pareto optimal public good provision with private donation when optimal non-linear income tax presents. The basic question tried to answer by this analysis is therefore whether subsidizing donation is welfare improving. This paper is able to provide new answers to these questions, looking at first the traditional income tax model in which government could control over charitable giving as part of the optimal tax policy, and then extending the analysis to a two-stage non-cooperative game where charitable giving is endogenous. The modification of the Samuelson Rule for the private provision or for the public provision of public good depending on whether aggregate charitable donation or government funding public good is a substitute or a complement to labour supply without the warm glow of giving. After considering the two-stage non-cooperative game in an economy with non-linear taxes, this paper concludes the unique Nash equilibrium for this game has the property that only high ability individuals would make a positive charitable donation to the public good.
