A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds in bankruptcy problems
2019/09/06
研討會日期 : 2019-09-06
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Min-Hung Tsay (蔡明宏)
主持人 : Professor Meng-Yu Liang
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Tsay received his Ph.D. in Economics from National Taiwan University in 2012. He is currently an Assistant Professor in Economics at National Chung Cheng University. His main research fields are Financial Economics and Microeconomic Theory and Its Applications.
演講摘要 : When a group of creditors has claims on a resource that is not enough to honor all claims, how should the resource be divided? This is the so-called bankruptcy problem. A well-known rule to solve this problem is the Talmud rule. We introduce a game that exploits standard consistency properties, as well as properties guaranteeing meaningful lower and upper bounds to all creditors. As we show, the game strategically justifies the rule. Our results are inspired by an axiomatic characterization of the Talmud rule in Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2004), who make use of the above meaningful lower and upper bounds together with consistency axiom to characterize the Talmud rule. The consistency axiom allows us to reduce n-person negotiation to 2-person negotiation, and then dramatically simplifies our analysis and allows us to focus on 2-person bargaining situation. We exploit the lower and upper bounds to design 2-person bargaining procedure. Our results and the above axiomatization for the Talmud rule not only complement each other, but also deepen our understanding of the Talmud rule.
