Evolution of Rules, Selection and Mutation: Efficiency and Egalitarianism
2018/11/06
研討會日期 : 2018-11-06
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Wei-Torng Juang (莊委桐)
主持人 : Professor Hsuan-Chih Lin
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Juang received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Cambridge in 1998. He is currently an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica. His research fields are Microeconomics and Mathematical Economics.
演講摘要 : In this paper, we construct a fairly general evolutionary model with mutation in which agents's actions are dictated by the rules they follow, there are a large number of rules and evolutionary selection applies at the rule level. In the literature, state-independent mutations has been shown at times to be very effective in terms of providing a theory of long-run equilibrium selection in models with fixed rules. In contrast, our first result shows that in our set-up with state-independent mutation, if the set of allowable rules are sufficiently rich, then every (equilibrium) outcome of the underlying game can survive in the long-run (they are stochastically stable). We next consider a state-dependent mutation framework in which costly mutations is less likely than less costly mutations. Under such an assumption regarding mutation, we obtain a very strong selection result: if the set of allowable rules are sufficiently rich then an outcome survives in the long-run only if it is efficient and egalitarian (a kind of Rawlsian MaxMin).
