Rent Extraction versus Efficiency in Auctions with Fixed Royalty Rates and Costly Entry
2019/02/26
研討會日期 : 2019-02-26
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Takeharu Sogo
主持人 : Professor Chih-Chun Yang
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Sogo received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Illinois. He is currently an Associate Professor at Osaka University of Economics. His research interests are Microeconomic Theory, Auction Theory, Industrial Organization, Behavioral Economics, Financial Economics.
演講摘要 : We investigate optimal auction mechanisms when bidders base costly entry decisions on their valuations, and payments depend on both the bids and asset payoffs generated by the winning bidder. We show the optimal mechanism can feature asymmetry, where the seller sets differential reserve prices so that bidders enter with strictly positive but different (ex-ante) probabilities, even when bidders are ex-ante identical. The optimality of asymmetric mechanisms extends to cash auctions when there is sufficient valuation uncertainty relative to entry costs. When bidders pay with a fixed royalty rate plus cash, the optimal degree of asymmetry rises with the royalty rate.
