Dynamic Screening with a Time (In)consistent Agent
2018/08/21
研討會日期 : 2018-08-21
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Peng-Ju Su (蘇芃竹)
主持人 : Professor Tzu-Ting Yang
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Su received her Ph.D. in Economics from University of Washington, Seattle in 2014. She is currently an Assistant Professor at National Taipei University. Her research interests are Contract Theory, Economics of Information, Game Theory.
演講摘要 : I study how private information on time inconsistency interacts with the traditional short-term screening contract in a principal-agent framework. Private information on time inconsistency is redundant but non-negligible. It preserves the agent's future information advantage, which restores the future rent-efficiency tradeoff and relaxes the current incentive compatibility for some types of the agent in comparison to the benchmark case with perfect information on time (in)consistency. These result in a distortion of future efficiency and, under some conditions, an improvement of current efficiency. The welfare of the time inconsistent agent is improved from the preservation of future information advantage, while that of the time consistent is distorted due to truncation of ability to extract future information rent earlier. The agent's naiveté affects to what extent the restored future rent-efficiency tradeoff relaxes the current incentive compatibility. For some specific form of naiveté, the principal is better off than under the traditional second-best contract.
