The Role of Real-Time Leaderboards in Dynamic Research Contests
2018/07/24
研討會日期 : 2018-07-24
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Bo Chen
主持人 : Professor Wei-Torng Juang
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Chen received his Ph.D. in Economics from Bonn Graduate School of Economics in Germany. He is currently an Assistant Professor at College of Industrial Management, King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals (KFUPM). His research fields are Industrial Organization, Mechanism Design (esp., Auctions and Contests), Information Design, Matching Markets.
演講摘要 : This paper studies information disclosure in research contests. We analyze a multi-agent winner-takes-all contest in which each agent decides when to stop a privately observed search for innovations. Each agent makes a one-time submission of her best discovery to the organizer before a deadline. The contest ends when submissions are made from all agents, and the agent with the best innovation wins. The contest organizer chooses between a public policy where all previous submissions are immediately revealed to the public, and a hidden policy where all submissions are revealed to the public after the organizer receives all submissions from the agents. We analyze the agents’ equilibrium behavior under the two disclosure policies. We find that the disclosure policies drastically affects the agents’ equilibrium search behavior. In particular, the organizer strictly prefers to immediately reveal a submission from a stopping agent for search contests with long horizons, in that such research contests induce the most intensive search behavior from the agents in equilibrium.
