Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences
2018/01/23
研討會日期 : 2018-01-23
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Mr. Ritesh Jain
主持人 : Professor Chih-Chun Yang
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Mr. Jain will receive his Ph.D. in Economics from The Ohio State University in 2018. His research fields are Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Mathematical Economics, Implementation Theory and Experimental Economics. He is applying for a position of the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica now.
演講摘要 : We study the implementation of social choice correspondences (SCC), in a complete information setting, using rationalizability as our solution concept. We find a condition which we call r-monotonicity to be necessary for the rationalizable implemen-tation of an SCC. r-monotonicity is strictly weaker than Maskin monotonicity, a condi-tion introduced by Maskin (1999). If an SCC satisfies a no worst alternative condition and a condition which we call ΘF -distinguishability, then we show that r-monotonicity is also sufficient for rationalizable implementation. We discuss the strength of these additional conditions. In particular, we find that a social choice correspondence which always selects at least two alternatives is rationalizably implementable if and only if it satisfies r-monotonicity. This paper, therefore, extends Bergemann et al. (2011) to the case of social choice correspondences.
