Rationality and Mutual Belief of Rationality in Second-price Auction and English Auction
2017/11/28
研討會日期 : 2017-11-28
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Chih-Chun Yang (楊智鈞)
主持人 : Professor Tzu-Ting Yang
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Yang received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Rochester in 2011. He is currently an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica. His research field are Game Theory and Economic Theory.
演講摘要 : In the private-value experiments, the truth-telling bidding (i.e., bidding up to own valuation) in English auction and overbidding in second-price auction exhibit a breakdown of the strategic equivalence (under weakly dominant strategy theory); moreover, a subject who regularly participates in eBay auctions significantly bids below his valuation. In a framework accommodating "beliefs of wide dispersion of valuations", we show English auction and second-price auction are not strategic equivalence for strategical sophisticated bidders. (1) In English auction, "rationality and common strong belief of rationality" implies truth telling, while in second-price auction every strategy is possible under "rationality and common belief of rationality." (2) Moreover, if there is a sufficiently small positive bidding cost, the second degree of strategic sophistication (i.e., "rationality and mutual strong belief of rationality") implies truth telling in English auction.
