Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima: Rationalizable Implementation and Repeated Implementation
2017/12/15
研討會日期 : 2017-12-15
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Yi-Chun Chen (陳逸羣)
主持人 : Professor Chun-Hsien Yeh
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Chen received his Ph.D. in Economics from Northwestern University in 2009. He is currently an Associate Professor at National University of Singapore. His research areas are Microeconomics Theory, Game Theory, Mathematical Economics and Information Economics.
演講摘要 : We study the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1999) but allow for the use of lottery and monetary transfer as in Abreu and Matsushima (AM, 1992, 1994). We therefore unify two well-established approaches of implementation theory. We first show that when there are at least three agents, Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for pure-strategy Nash implementation by a “direct” mechanism. Second, taking mixed strategies into consideration, we show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for mixed-strategy Nash implementation by a …finite but indirect mechanism. Different from previous papers, our approach possesses many appealing features, e.g., finite mechanisms (with no integer or modulo game) are used; mixed strategies are handled explicitly; no bad outcomes or transfer used on the equilibrium path. We also show how our finite mechanism can be modified to achieve implementation in rationalizable strategies and repeated implementation in mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
