Condorcet-winning Public Information in Oligopolistic Markets
2017/12/26
研討會日期 : 2017-12-26
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Ching-Jen Sun (孫慶仁)
主持人 : Professor Chun-Hsien Yeh
地點 : Conference Room C103
演講者簡介 : Professor Sun received his Ph.D. in Economics from The Ohio State University in 2008. He is currently a Senior Lecturer at Deakin University. His research interests are Game Theory, Industrial Organization, and Contract Theory.
演講摘要 : How does majority-appeasing dissemination of public information affect utilitarian welfare and generate conflict in the marketplace? We examine Condorcet preferences for public information of consumers with different valuations for a homogeneous good in oligopolistic markets where identical producers face a common shock to cost of production. We characterize the Condorcet-winning precision of information for consumers and the profit-maximizing precision for producers -- in terms of the demand function, number of firms, and the mode of competition (quantity versus price). We report conditions under which majority-appeasement (i) hurts both consumers' surplus and profits or (ii) remains conflict-free.
