A Unified Approach: Rationality and Common Belief of Rationality
2017/09/05
研討會日期 : 2017-09-05
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Chih-Chun Yang (楊智鈞)
主持人 : Professor Meng-Yu Liang
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Yang received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Rochester in 2011. He is currently an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica. His research interests are Game Theory and Economic Theory.
演講摘要 : “Cautious rationality” and “semicautious rationality” are defined as an optimal choice of strategies under a belief with full support conditions. In finite games, we provide the epistemic analysis of “rationality and common belief of rationality” (RCBR) for three notions of rationality and three notions of belief (strong belief, assumption, and weak assumption). Various impossibility results of RCBR are shown for the notions of strong belief/assumption and cautious/semicautious rationality. Within the framework of lexicographic probability system (LPS) beliefs, we also provide a unified approach for the perfection of backward induction and forward induction. We show that, in every finite extensive-form game with complete information, under various notions of rationality, rationality and common strong belief of rationality (RCSBR) in the universal LPS-based type structure characterizes various notions of backward induction and forward induction.
