演講者簡介 : Professor Revelli received his Ph.D. from University College London in 1998. He is currently a Professor of University of Torino. His research interests include Econometrics, Public Economics, and Public Finance.
演講摘要 : This paper puts forward a new test of Tiebout sorting that relies on the
exogenous time structure of recurrent local elections. The test is based on the idea that the political uncertainty that is associated with periodic competitive elections should be expected to induce procrastination of internal migration decisions until uncertainty is resolved, thus projecting the calendar of local elections onto the timing of sorting processes. Conversely, interjurisdictional migration flows that are not driven by demand for public goods over which localities vote recurrently ought to be orthogonal to the timing of municipal elections. Empirically, I study sorting time patterns across several thousands of peninsular Italy’s municipalities through more than a decade and find evidence of an ‘electoral migration cycle,’ in the sense that the timing of internal migration is systematically influenced by the schedule of staggered mayoral elections.
