Bayesian coalitional rationality and rationalizability
2017/06/06
研討會日期 : 2017-06-06
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Mr. Yongchuan Qiao
主持人 : Professor Chih-Chun Yang
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Mr. Qiao is currently a Ph. D. student at the Department of Economics, National University of Singapore. His supervisor is Professor Luo Xiao and his research topic is "Game Theory".
演講摘要 : In a semantic framework where each player holds a CPS belief, we offer the notion of "Bayesian coalitional rationality of a coalition" (i.e., Bayesian c-rationality) to capture the idea of common knowledge among members of a coalition that no credible coalitional gains exist. We characterize the solution concept of "Bayesian coalitional rationalizability" (i.e., Bayesian
c-rationalizability) by common knowledge of Bayesian c-rationality (of all coalitions). We also show Bayesian c-rationalizability is outcome equivalent to a posteriori Bayesian c-equilibrium, a coalitional version of a posteriori equilibrium. These results provide the epistemic foundation of Bayesian c-rationalizability.
