演講者簡介 : Dr. Tierney has received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Rochester in 2015. He is currently a CIREQ Postdoctoral fellow in Université de Montréal and Scholar in Residence in Concordia University. His research fields are Market design, resource allocation, economies with indivisibilities. He is applying for a position of the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica now.
演講摘要 : We characterize the set of pairwise incentive compatible and non-discriminatory allocation rules for the assignment game. We consider various notions of feasibility and incentive compatibility. Our most general result is that a pairwise incentive compatible, non-discriminatory, and welfare-continuous rule must belong to a new family we call the Endogenous Outside Option rules. Unlike previous studies, we put no restriction on the set of matches that is to be made, nor on the payment that goes to unmatched agents. In particular, we allow for jobs to go unfilled even when it would be efficient to fill them, and this allows us to study wage caps or, equivalently, reservation profits requested by the employer side. The Endogenous Outside Option rules are a finite-dimensional family of lattice-extremal rules. Each such rule is given by a finite dimensional parameter of bounds, and then for each economy selects an applicant-optimal equilibrium (in personalized prices) allocation that respects these bounds. This equilibrium need not be stable. The family includes both the min-price Walrasian rule and (for the one-job case) Sprumont's (2013) maxmed family.
