演講者簡介 : Professor Chen received his Ph.D. in Economics from Northwestern University in 2009. He is currently an Associate Professor at National University of Singapore. His research fields are Microeconomics Theory, Game Theory, Mathematical Economics and Information Economics.
演講摘要 : The paper considers a complete-information social choice environment where agents are expected utility maximizers and monetary transfers are available. We first show that a social choice function is fully implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium in a finite mechanism if and only if it satisfies (Maskin-) monotonicity. We also show that a social choice function is fully implementable in rationalizability in a finite mechanism if and only if it satisfies the monotonicity* condition proposed by Bergemann, Morris, and Tercieux (2011). The latter result implies that every monotonic* social choice function is continuously implementable in the sense of Oury and Tercieux (2012).
