Relations among the Central Rules in Bankruptcy Problems: a Strategic Justification Perspective (Chinese presentation)
2016/12/30
研討會日期 : 2016-12-30
時間 : 10:30
主講人 : Professor Min-Hung Tsay
主持人 : Professor Chun-Hsien Yeh
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Tsay received his Ph.D. in International Business from National Taiwan University at 2012 and Ph.D. in Finance from National Central University at 2014. He is currently an Assistant Professor at National Chung Cheng University. His research fields are Microeconomic Theory and Its Applications, Financial Economics.
演講摘要 : When a firm goes bankrupt, how should its liquidation value be allocated among its creditors? This is the so-called bankruptcy problem. We provide a unified framework to explore relations among the central bankruptcy rules (the constrained equal awards rule, the con- strained equal losses rule, the Talmud rule, and the proportional rule) from a strategic justification perspective. We introduce four games (one game for each central rule), and show that each game strategically justifies one central rule. Each game is a three-stage extensive form game, in which the first two stages of the games are the same, and each final stage contains one unique bilateral negotiation. With- out invoking any exogenously given bankruptcy rule to solve bilateral negotiations, our results unveil novel connections among the central rules by focusing on different features of noncooperative procedures in the final stages, and enhance our understanding of the situations under which one rule may be more proper to use than other rules.
