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Simultaneous Screening and College Admissions: An Experimental Study


  • 研討會日期 : 2016-05-17
  • 時間 : 14:30
  • 主講人 : Professor Yi-Yi Chen
  • 主持人 : Professor Wei-Torng Juang
  • 地點 : Conference Room B110
  • 演講者簡介 : Prof. Chen received her Ph.D. in Economics from Washington University in St. Louis. She is currently an Assistant Professor at Feng Chia University. Her research fields are Experimental Economics, and Behavioral Economics.
  • 演講摘要 : In this paper, we investigate a decentralized college-admission problem in which colleges can set the same entrance examination date as competitors’, namely the conflicting strategy, to prevent students’ multiple applications. We theoretically and experimentally show that under some conditions of colleges’ capacity and prestige difference, a lower-ranked college can constitute a desired application pool and then enroll better students by using the conflicting strategy. In addition, when the capacity of higher-ranked college is large enough, a lower-ranked one can enroll better students by using the conflicting strategy regardless of their prestige difference.