演講者簡介 : Prof. Lu received his Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University in 2011. He is currently an Assistant Professor at Simon Fraser University. His research fields are Game Theory, and Microeconomic Theory.
演講摘要 : This paper studies monotonic equilibria in a multi-sender version of Crawford and Sobel's (1982) cheap talk model, i.e. equilibria where senders' strategies are weakly monotonic in the state and where the receiver's strategy is strictly monotonic in the senders' messages. Monotonic equilibria have interval form, are bounded away from full revelation, and are straightforward to compute; they are closely related to the set of coordination-free equilibria identified by Lu (2015). When senders can be ranked according to bias: (i) in monotonic equilibria, senders most biased toward larger actions are informative when the receiver's desired action is smallest, and vice versa; and (ii) monotonic equilibria are collusion-proof in a strong sense. The monotonicity of sender strategies is shown to be a weak assumption if made alone, while the strict monotonicity of the receiver's strategy is motivated by the possibility of misunderstanding.
