演講者簡介 : Mr. Yu will receive his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Minnesota in 2016. His research fields are Microeconomic Theory, Macroeconomic Theory, and Public Economics. He is applying for a position of the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica now.
演講摘要 : People with time-inconsistent preferences tend to make intertemporal choices different from their original intentions. In particular, time-inconsistent agents make sub-optimal saving decisions. This paper studies the optimal savings and insurance policy in an economy with time-inconsistent agents who privately observe their skill. I introduce a mechanism that can elicit private information at zero cost by threatening sophisticated time-inconsistent agents with o -equilibrium path policies that can undo commitments, and fooling naively time-inconsistent agents with empty promises. The government can implement the full information efficient optimum, which is better than the constrained optimum obtained with traditional proposals to increase savings, like linear savings subsidies or mandatory savings rules. I show that welfare increases monotonically with the population of time-inconsistent agents. In essence, the presence of time-inconsistent agents improves the government's ability to provide insurance. I characterize the tax policies for decentralization, and also discuss its implications on the design of social security and retirement plans.
