Obedience to Rules with Mild Formal Sanctions: The Roles of Informal Sanctions and Voting
2015/11/03
研討會日期 : 2015-11-03
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Josie Chen
主持人 : Professor Tzu-Ting Yang
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Chen received her Ph.D. in Economics from Brown University, U.S.A. She is currently an Assistant Professor at National Taipei University. Her research fields are Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics and Applied Microeconomics.
演講摘要 : Governments sometimes promote rules backed by sanctions too weak to make obedience privately optimal. Factors that may help make such rules effective include the presence of informal sanctions by peers, and implementation through voting. I study the impact of non-deterrent formal sanctions on voluntary contributions to a public good in a laboratory experiment. The effect is studied both in the presence and absence of informal sanctions, under fully exogenous implementation and after both implemented and randomly overridden voting. I find that informal sanctions strengthen the effect of formal ones in most conditions. However, voted implementation of a non-deterrent formal sanction has no significant effect on contribution in my data, which suggests a reason for caution when studying exogenous implementation by a random vote override procedure.
