The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees: An Experimental Analysis
2015/12/01
研討會日期 : 2015-12-01
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Wooyoung Lim
主持人 : Professor Hanjoon Jung
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Lim received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Pittsburgh in 2010. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Economics at The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. His Primary research fields are Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory and Secondary are Experimental Economics, and Industrial Organization.
演講摘要 : We experimentally investigate the informational theory of legislative committees first proposed by Gilligan and Krehbiel [1987, 1989]. Two committees provide policy-relevant information to a legislature under two different procedural rules. Under the open rule, the legislature is free to make any decision; under the closed rule, the legislature is constrained to choose between a committee's proposal and a status quo. We obtain evidence in support of the outlier principle i.e., more extreme preferences of the committees reduce the extent of information transmission and the heterogeneity principle i.e., more information can be extracted by the legislature in the presence of multiple committees with heterogeneous preferences. We, however, obtain mixed evidence for the more controversial restrictive rule principle, which says that the closed rule is more efficient than the open rule. We develop level-k models to rationalize our findings that depart from the equilibrium predictions.
