演講者簡介 : Professor Ju received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Rochester in 2001. He is currently a Professor of Economics at Seoul National University. His research fields are Economic Theory, Social Choice Theory, Public Finance, Game Theory, and Mechanism Design.
演講摘要 : We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies in which agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. In this context, we investigate three categories of fairness in the initial assignment of rights, in the transaction of rights, and in the end-state allocation, their implications and relations. To do so, we explore allocation rules represented by a composition of a rights-assignment rule (to assign each prole of claims individual property rights over the endowment) and Walrasian or other individually rational exchange. Using variants of fairness based on no-envy as end-state principles, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the three focal egalitarian rights-assignment rules, known in the literature on rationing problems as constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, and proportional rules. We apply our results to problems of greenhouse gas emissions and contested water rights.
