Information Revelation in the Property Right Theory of the Firms
2015/10/20
研討會日期 : 2015-10-20
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Peng-Ju Su
主持人 : Professor Wei-Torng Juang
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Su received her Ph.D. in Economics from University of Washington, Seattle at 2014. She is currently an Assistant Professor at National Taipei University. Her research fields are Contract Theory, Economics of Information, Industrial Organization, and Game Theory.
演講摘要 : I incorporate revelation of asymmetric information through shared ownership (partnership) into the Property Right Theory of the rms. Shared ownership is optimal as a joint result of mitigating hold-up and inducing information revelation. Due to the incomplete contracting nature, partnership is incentive compatible if it induces a positive probability of truthful revelation within the relationship as well as when the relationship breaks. This off-the-equilibrium-path incentive compatibility results in the optimality of partnership even for the most efficient type of the informed party. Incentive to invest in the relationship specific asset is then distorted downward as the hold-up concern is not efficiently mitigated. The level of shared ownership reflects the relative magnitude of the information rent effect and the hold-up effect.
