Coordination in Social Networks: Communication by Actions
2015/08/25
研討會日期 : 2015-08-25
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Chun-Ting Chen
主持人 : Professor Wei-Torng Juang
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Chen received his Ph.D. in Economics from The Pennsylvania State University at 2015. He is currently an Assistant Professor at National Taiwan University. His research fields are Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Network Economics.
演講摘要 : This paper studies a collective action problem in a setting of discounted repeated coordination games in which players know their neighbors’ inclination to participate as well as monitor their neighbors’ past actions. I define strong connectedness to characterize those states in which, for every two players who incline to participate, there is a path consisting of players with the same inclination to connect them. Given that the networks are fixed, finite, connected, commonly known, undirected and without cycles, I show that if the priors have full support on the strong connectedness states, there is a (weak) sequential equilibrium in which the ex-post efficient outcome repeats after a finite time T in the path when discount factor is sufficiently high. This equilibrium is constructive and does not depend on public or private signals other than players’ actions.
